On point operation iraqi freedom pdf

This report covers four of the five engineer battlefield functions performed by Engineers: Mobility, Survivability, Geospatial, and General Engineering. To provide the command with information concerning the performance of AMD weapon systems, interoperability, training issues, and procedures during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

To take advantage of this opportunity for learning, the Commandant created a Combat Assessment Team. Its mission was to systematically collect and objectively analyze combat data on critical warfighting issues. Training observed; foot patrols in simulated urban terrain, convoys, cordon and search operations, a Special Ops Task Force raid on a suspected WMD site and a Quick Reaction Force QRF rescue of a compromised Special Ops Task Force, crowd control, political rally security, and election registration oversight and security.

Additional reach-back support elements contributed to refinement of the data and tracking. He wasreferring to Iraqi air defense units "painting" his aircraft with radar. Thepilot's preferred response was an immediate volley of missiles and bombs tosuppress Iraqi defenses.

However, my chagrined source said the rules ofengagement regarding the location of Iraqi defenses sometimes limited hispreferred response. Iraqis would position anti-aircraft weapons near a mosque or aschool, and a counter-attack risked damaging those "peaceful" buildings. Anoff-target missile handed Saddam an easy and emotionally effectivepropaganda victory of the ilk, "See, the bad Americans bomb mosques and killchildren.

Of course, the no-fly zone in the north was created to keepSaddam from committing further genocide against the Kurds, but an explosionand a crater make for great television images -- a sensational immediacy --that obscured the terrible facts. I argued in early that the Bush administration needed toend The Slow War with a victory. Enforcing the U. Those resolutions demanded that Saddam end his depredationsagainst ethnic and religious groups in Iraq Kurds and Shias and requiredhim to end completely his weapons of mass destruction programs.

He alsohad to destroy WMD delivery systems. EMBED for wordpress. Want more? Advanced embedding details, examples, and help! Publication date Topics United States. O Includes bibliographical references and index Foreword -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Prologue -- Setting the stage -- Overview of Operation Iraqi Freedom : May to January -- The US Army's historical legacy of military operations other than war and the planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom -- The rise of the Iraqi insurgency and the US Army's response -- Leading the new campaign : transitions in command and control in Operation Iraqi Freedom -- Intelligence and high-value target operations -- Detainee operations -- Fighting the battle of ideas in Iraq -- Combined arms operations in Iraq -- The US Army and the reconstruction of Iraq -- A country united, stable, and free : US Army governance operations in Iraq -- Training the Iraqi security forces -- Logistics and combat service support operations -- Taking care of soldiers -- Implications.

Most important, the manual introduced and described "full-dimensional operations. To deal with the fundamentally changed problem of fighting and moving up and down the spectrum of conflict, the manual included an entire chapter devoted to operations other than war. Figure 2. Convinced of the importance of joint and combined integration, Franks led the TRADOC staff on a staff ride that reviewed the connections between the French defeat of the British off of the Virginia Capes and the combined American and French operations at Yorktown.

He chose this specific campaign to convey to the TRADOC staff, by example, the fundamentally joint nature of successful operations and the absolute interdependence of joint forces at the operational and strategic levels.

General Franks argued that this was so historically and would be so in the future. In a section titled "Conflict Termination," the manual noted, "Success on the battlefield does not always lead to success in war.

By no means complete in anticipating the difficult operations to come, FM clearly articulated fundamental and important changes to the way the Army thought about what it might be asked to do and how to do those things in the post-Cold War era.

They produced insights into how to leverage technology to meet emerging requirements. The battle labs supported experiments that featured new technologies which might have a high payoff as well as effect dramatic changes in formations and organizations. Their intent was to test new technologies and radical combat formations embodied in an organization called the Mobile Strike Force. Air mechanization and digitally enabled battle command were central themes in both of these experiments.

Additionally, the labs produced several concepts and equipment that the Army eventually incorporated; from the mundane "smart" identification card to auxiliary power units for tanks.

Convinced that this was the way to enhance combat capability without building new combat systems from the ground up, Generals Sullivan and Franks sought to digitally link combat systems based on a straightforward working hypothesis. They believed that if the Army equipped units with the means to see each other and to see the enemy, those units would be able to operate at higher tempos than opponents.

This, in turn, would make them more lethal and thus more survivable. All of this could be achieved without adding more armor or building new systems. The labs sought to test this hypothesis and find means to improve the ability of units to see the enemy. This led to a fair number of sometimes-bizarre efforts ranging from hand- launched unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs to various non line-of-sight strike capabilities.

A suite of digital communication systems and software to aid decision making and shared situational awareness supported all of these emerging capabilities. They did not develop their working hypothesis out of whole cloth. It came in stages. IVIS contained the seeds of digitally enabling the crews to see each other and share information. But Franks was skeptical. He was not convinced that tank crews really could fight the tank and communicate with each other by looking at very crude computer screens.

Franks asked the program executive officer PEO whether he could field a single platoon of tanks in a coming NTC rotation to enable a test under what Franks described as the most competitive environment short of combat. General Franks visited one of the platoon's after- action reviews. Johndrow, were effusive about IVIS and what it could do for them in a fight. With it, all four tanks had computer screens that enabled them to "see" one another and pass email digitally. But the system was fragile, hard to use, and the racket produced by the constant warbling noise of the digital carrier wave was almost unbearable.

Despite this, Johndrow was enthusiastic in his praise for the possibilities to Franks. Despite the flaws and the relatively primitive state of the system, Franks understood as he listened to the tankers explain that their ability to share information nearly instantly "magnified their combat power. Ten years later, Johndrow served in Iraq as the command sergeant major of the digitally linked, air-transported 3rd Squadron, 2nd ACR Light.

A Digitally Linked Battle Command System To reach its Force XXI objective, the Army conducted a series of live, virtual, and constructive simulations to test the root hypothesis - battlefield visualization and digitized communication for all units would enhance the Army's warfighting effectiveness. It also developed combat requirements, not only for communication systems, but also for decision making and situational awareness aids as well. The Force XXI efforts were critical toward maintaining the Army's status as the most capable land force in the world.

The relatively inexpensive investments in technology and battle command promised an exponential return in capabilities that would overwhelm any conceivable adversary.

However, as General Sullivan often reminded soldiers - there were "no time- outs. Moreover, while FM was an excellent - even prescient - start in describing how and where the Army fit into the nation's national security structure and strategy, ultimately it required revision to address the challenges imposed by these ongoing operations.

The contingency operations expanded "warfighting" beyond the context of the traditional maneuver battles and engagements. The new threats resided all along the full spectrum of conflict, from low-grade political and social instability within a nation-state to major combat operations.

The s did not break this trend. Over the decade, SIPRNET became ubiquitous, with units at every echelon having access to a secure network where classified plans, discussions, and information could be shared freely. Collaborating without the constraints of mailing classified data or talking over a secure telephone was a quantum leap in efficiency and effectiveness. In addition to desktop access to the latest plans and intelligence information, the secure email and chat rooms fostered crosstalk at all levels.

Planners at home stations could follow current operations and conduct parallel planning to anticipate requirements. Conversely, an overeager command could monitor every potential contingency and plan for commitments that would never be levied - creating unnecessary confusion and fatigue. As Franks anticipated, these operations challenged the Army's existing capabilities and exposed obsolescence in the AirLand Battle doctrine. Meeting the new reality with a smaller force, equipped and proficient in a doctrine that was increasingly outdated and overcome by the changing security environment, forced solutions that were innovative, if occasionally painful or disastrous.

The decade's worth of experience delivered several key lessons learned that paid dividends during OIF. Some lessons were self-evident and readily incorporated into the force.

Others were not fully appreciated at the time but were eventually learned, practiced, and applied in Iraq to great effect. Still others would prove elusive, demanding more operational introspection and organizational learning. The result was an Army crossing the border into Iraq with many - but not all - of the lessons of the past decade explicitly or implicitly incorporated into the force.

Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda - A Painful Education Process The histories of these operations have been chronicled; the causes and effects of where the nation and its Army succeeded or fell short in these experiences have been extensively debated.

However, regardless of the verdict of success or failure, what is clear is that the Army was able to learn from these early experiences in s' warfare. Each contingency operation presented a unique scenario that led to some specific lessons. As OIF unfolded, the Army encountered elements of all these contingencies and was able to apply many - but not all - of the lessons gathered along the way. Arguably, the Army was able to assimilate many of the lessons from Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda in ways that have only become apparent in the aftermath of OIF.

However, it culminated as the first real US experience in the warlord politics so prevalent in much of the developing world.

Though characterized since as a case of mission creep in the extreme, capped by the searing pictures of dead US soldiers being dragged through the street, there was a positive Army legacy from Somalia.

The Army was, in fact, hugely successful in the humanitarian assistance phases of the Somalia expedition. Though not obvious at the time, particularly in the aftermath of the loss of 18 soldiers, the Army learned how to wield combat power to stabilize a region and set the conditions for humanitarian assistance. The Army also gained experience in operating in the unfamiliar political and cultural environment of clan and warlord politics.

Moreover, in the aftermath of the Battle of Mogadishu, the Army learned about the rapidly changing and diverse nature of a single combat operation. The Task Force Ranger raid demonstrated the need to maintain a robust and multifaceted force, conditioned to transition rapidly from peace operations to full combat operations.

This lesson played in virtually every subsequent expedition. However, only in later years would the Army add to its positive legacy as a full-spectrum force. The mere threat of a pending airborne invasion by the 82nd Airborne Division brought about the final collapse of General Raoul Cedras' regime.

Soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division on the streets of Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitian maintained stability to facilitate the first democratic elections that country had known for many years. The Army relearned the lesson that the tactical actions of the Army soldier have powerful strategic, diplomatic, and informational effects.

This lesson, gathered then, would be applied to great effect in the desert towns and cities of Iraq. Rwanda Like Somalia, Rwanda started as a humanitarian relief operation that had great potential to devolve into another clan warfare experience. The Army and the nation reluctantly approached the crisis in Rwanda with the memories of Mogadishu fresh on the collective consciousness.

Lacking a doctrinal base that placed these types of operations within the proper context of the Army's mission, the Somalia experience lingered and had a palpable effect on future operational and strategic decisions. Once on the scene, the US Army contributed to improving conditions in Rwanda.

In doing so, it gathered valuable and long-lasting lessons that, unfortunately, were marginalized or overlooked amid the noise of downsizing and other missions. Perhaps the greatest lesson was that the Army led its deployment not with combat units and equipment tanks and armored vehicles , but rather with combat support and combat service support personnel and systems.

The tip of the spear was not a mechanized infantry company led by a burly male Ranger second lieutenant; it was a water purification platoon led by a female second lieutenant. The Army demonstrated an understanding of warfare in its broadest and most holistic context; that is, sometimes force may be applied to organize a solution rather than to impose one. The Army demonstrated the ability to tailor forces, doctrine, techniques, and lethal force to the environment.

This flexibility would be required on the battlefields of Iraq in The Balkans The disintegration of the former Yugoslavian republic led to the Army's first long-term involvement in aftermath wars of self-determination, or "ethno-religious-based wars" since before World War I. The various experiences in the Balkans were disturbingly reminiscent of the previous contingency operations, yet were laced with new and even more challenging problems.

With less infrastructure and capability, it faced a much more complex environment and a more complicated and unconventional enemy.

Moreover, it had several less-than-successful experiences in "other than war" operations under its belt and was not institutionally excited about a similar experience in the Balkans. The unfolding Balkan crises presented the nation and the Army with a set of complex, multifaceted, and ambiguous security challenges for which there were few political, legal, or doctrinal guideposts.

Attempts to minimize the strategic risk by imposing an arbitrary end date exacerbated operational ambiguity. In this environment of legitimacy - diplomatic, informational, military, and economic - the Army had the relative luxury not a single combat death in eight years to experiment with, and evolve, the doctrine and equipment left over from AirLand Battle.

In executing its mission, the Army had the opportunity to wrestle with the challenge of applying overwhelming conventional force as an instrument of peace enforcement and peacekeeping. Soldiers relearned how to wield a broadsword as a rapier, using a series of small strokes and precise blows to defeat an elusive threat indirectly over a longer period of time. Yet, based on the previous half-decade's lessons, the Army also had to maintain the soldier's ability to decisively destroy any threats if the situation changed.

In short, the Army learned, reluctantly at times, how to apply an AirLand conventional force across an expanding spectrum of conflict with finesse and patience. The Army served as a supporting effort to the air component's strategic bombing campaign. The air campaign and diplomatic pressure forced the Serbians to withdraw from Kosovo, enabling ground forces to enter unopposed and consolidate the victory.

Several key lessons from the Kosovo experience were brought to bear in OIF. The first lesson was that the air component produced the combat victory, but the Kosovars did not return until the combined ground forces secured the province - achieving the US strategic objective. In every way that mattered, air power won the fighting in Kosovo, while ground units served to consolidate that victory. The services learned important lessons in joint and combined cooperation and coordination that continued effectively during OIF.

Other lessons include movement away from prescriptive time-phased force and deployment data 13? The Task Force Hawk an attack helicopter task force from US Army Europe deployment to Albania in support of operations in Kosovo offered valuable lessons in air-ground integration and capability-based task organizing later applied in Iraq.

Task Force Hawk failed to produce tangible benefit beyond driving home integration and training issues associated with deploying and employing forces. Kosovo drove home the lessons learned for stability operations and support operations in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia.

In the summer of , the Army executed a series of exercises designed to certify the 4th ID - the first fully digitized unit in the Army's future digital force. The 4th ID spent most of the summer of in the field under the leadership of Major General William Wallace, testing the concepts for employment, new organizations, and required technologies. On the basis of those division-level exercises, and supported by the BCTP, the Army determined final adjustments of the division, its equipment, and its organization prior to a final round of certification exercises in the spring and fall of The Army delivered a certified, fit-to-fight, "digital" division in more than enough time to see combat in Iraq.

Reimer, an interested participant in the exercises in the summer of , fully understood that Force XXI was not an end state. As he put it, "The Army is combining industrial age equipment - like M1A1 tanks and AH attack helicopters - with information-age technology to vastly improve our warfighting capability. Called the Limited Conversion Division LCD , the new organization was smaller than its predecessors but was structured to take advantage of the increased lethality afforded by digitally linked units.

The plan was to field the advanced weapon systems into the LCD structure as funding and development allowed. Nonetheless, there were many notable successes. The COE, the notional training environment, replicated the potential threats an Army unit might face as well as the overall security environment in which such operations might take place.

The work to conceptualize the COE forced 14?